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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies an online retail supply chain that includes one referral infomediary and one retailer, in which the 
infomediary provides demand referral service to retailers and incentive rebates to customers. A linear dual-channel 
demand with the effect of customer incentive and horizontal service cooperation model was established, and then the 
optimal policies of infomediary and retailers in centralized and decentralized supply chain were analyzed. Moreover, a 
horizontal cooperation contract based on customer incentive cost as well as referral service price was developed to 
coordinate the supply chain. The results revealed that the contract contributed to profit optimization of online retail 
supply chain and effective win-win cooperation. Finally, we analyze the impact of rebate sensitivity and market share 
on these optimal policies and illustrate the results by some numerical examples. 
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1. Introduction 
The rapid development of Information technology 
and Internet presents the retailers with the 
opportunities for expansion to new online 
segments. According to the recent report of China 
Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), the 
number of online shopping users reached 242 
million and utilization ratio of online shopping rose 
to 42.9% by the end of December 2012[1]. The 
increase of users’ purchase power and the 
combination of online consumption habit and the 
forms of mobile and social online shopping 
promote the growth of online retail market. 
The Internet market structure is in a rapid 
optimization stage while the online shopping users 
rapidly increase in number. Firms are increasingly 
embracing integrated Internet-based supply chains 
because such chains are believed to enhance 
efficiency and competitiveness [2, 3]. The Internet 
has opened up opportunities for firms to share 
information and efficiently collaborate their 
activities with other entities in the supply chain [4]. 
E-commerce has given rise to a new breed of 
intermediaries, the so-called information  
intermediaries or infomediaries [5, 6]. An 
infomediary plays an expanded role in brokering 
prospect information in product categories, such 
as automobiles, insurance, and real estate, where 
the purchase decisions that consumers face are 
complex and frequently require direct interactions 
with salespeople [7]. The lowering of search costs 
with the advent of the Internet has changed the 
shopping way of consumers. With the help of 
online infomediary, consumers can get the 
information they need to make more informed 
choices [8]. For example, Shopping.com collects 
the consumers’ comments and offers online 
comparison shopping, and is currently one of the 
fastest growing shopping destinations for a 
comprehensive set of products. It recommends 
interested customers to some trusted online 
stores, such as Ebay.com, Amazon.com and 
Buy.com. 
Several recent studies have elaborated on the 
referral service, price of segments and other 
marketing problems. Chen et al. (2002) analyze 
the effect of referral infomediary on retail markets 
and examines the contractual arrangements that 
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they should use in selling their services [9]. The 
infomediary helps consumers to costlessly get an 
additional retail price quote before purchase and 
endows enrolled retailers with a price 
discrimination mechanism. Viswanathan et al. 
(2007) investigate the role of online infomediaries 
in market segmentation and price discrimination in 
the automotive retailing context based on three 
online buying service (OBS) pattern [7].  
The result shows that consumers who obtain price 
information pay lower prices (for the same 
product), whereas consumers who obtain product 
information pay higher prices. Chen and Yao 
(2012) study the optimal decisions of infomediary’s 
effort and retailer’s order quantity in centralized 
and decentralized supply chain, and propose a 
horizontal cooperation contract based on sharing 
marketing effort cost [10]. 
Furthermore, the quantity and quality of 
information about companies, products, brands or 
services via online media, in the form of scores or 
comments, becomes the core competitive 
advantage of infomediary [11-13]. Recent evidence 
suggests that consumer reviews have become 
very important for online purchase decisions and 
product sales [14]. According to real data on firm 
security prices, Luo (2009) finds that negative 
WOM (Word of Mouth) of customers has significant 
direct short- and long-term effects on firm cash 
flows and stock prices [15].  
Cheung and Lee  (2012) focus on the factors that 
drive consumers to spread positive digital WOM in 
online consumer-opinion platforms and present the 
positive relationship between the perception of the 
opportunity to enhance consumers’ own 
reputations and their eWOM (electronic Word of 
Mouth) intentions [16].  Consumers are considered 
as co-providers in the online consumption process 
and intimately involved in the transition from selling 
the product to selling the experience [17]. 
In addition to these internal factors, customers 
incentive plan of infomediary becomes the external 
induce to encourage customers to write and 
disseminate their reviews and comments. Some 
online shopping platforms and virtual communities 
provides many kinds of customer incentives, such 
as price discount, coupon, cash rebate et al, to 
encourage customers to share their shopping 
experience and record their comments. But 
researchers have not yet studied the customer 
incentive plans provided by infomediary, even 
though understanding these mechanisms could 
enhance customers’ behavior of reviews 
dissemination and infomediary ability to 
recommendation of products and services. 
Our primary interests of this research focus on 
the effect of customer incentive mechanism and 
the demand referral service cooperation between 
infomediary and retailer.  
The aforesaid literature usually does not explicitly 
consider the impact of customer incentive on the 
final online demand, the service cooperation and 
supply chain coordination. We will characterize 
supply chain demands, equilibrium prices, and 
incentive commission paid by infomediary. The 
coordination mechanisms of the online retail 
supply chain are also to be investigated. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 outlines the model framework and the 
necessary assumptions and notations. Section 3 
proposes the optimal policies in Stackelberg 
decentralized supply chain. Service contract of 
supply chain is discussed in Section 4. And 
some numerical examples are given in Section 5 
and the paper concludes with some remarks in 
Section 6. 
2. Model Formulation 
In an online retail supply chain, a retailer sells the 
product through self-owned channel as well as 
through an infomediary website. The retailer pays 
the infomediary for the referral service at t per unit. 
The infomediary only provides the customers with 
product and price information and recommends the 
potential customers to the retailer.  
Thus, the retailer orders the products from 
upstream supplier, sells to his direct customers 
from self marketing effort and indirect customers 
from the demand referral (Figure 1). It is 
reasonable to expect that the infomediary gets the 
compensation from the retailer for demand referral 
service. Furthermore a rebate r will be given to the 
customers as an incentive to for recording their 
experiences and comments on the products and 
services in detail.  
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The linear rebate function kr represents the 
customer incentive plan and parameter k (k>0) 
denotes the positive effect of rebate. Moreover the 
rebate r indicates the quantity and quality of 
customer eWOM, and the parameter k represents 
the recommendation effectiveness for the referral 
potential customers. As in Liu et al. (2013) [18], we 
suppose the retailer and infomediary both face 
independent demand and the retailer declares the 
same price p to both two customer segments.  
Assume that all the potential customers influenced 
by the price and the referral customers are also 
dependent on the amount of rebate. 
Let iD and rD  be the market demand share of the 
infomediary and the retailer respectively. Assume 
that (1 )DD  proportion potential customers will 
buy the product from the retailer, while the other 
DD  proportion will come from the infomediary 
(0 1D  ).
The similar linear demand functions are frequently 
used in supply chains research [19-21]. The 
common concave function 2 2rK  denotes the 
customer incentive cost ( 0K ! ) [22]. 
Assume that the purchase cost, sales cost and 
transportation cost of retailer is zero and 
unfulfilled demand is lost. See Table 1 for 
summary of notation. 
Therefore, the following Eqs. 1 and 2 capture the 
direct demand of the retailer and the referral 
demand of the infomediary respectively. 
D E  (1 )rD D p                                              
(1) 
iD D p krD E                                                (2) 
Where 0E ! represents the price effect and 0k !
denotes the positive effect of incentive rebate. They 
are both constants during the whole horizon. 
3.The optimal service and sales polices in a 
retailer Stackelberg game 
Assume that retailer is the leader of Stackelberg 
game. The firms’ objectives can be divided into the 
following two-stage problem: in stage one, the 
retailer determines the service price t of the referral 
demand before the sales horizon; in stage two, the 
infomediary determines the customer rebate r in 
accordance with the referral price t. Infomediary 
provides all the referral demand to the retailer and 
gets the paid service fee, and the retailer 
undertakes the customer’s order fulfillment and 
gets the retailing price. 
For fixed referral service t, the infomediary’s 
purpose is to choose the customer rebate r to 
maximize the profit i
Figure 1. Supply chain of 
 the retailer and infomediary. 
Notation Description 
D Potential customers of the whole 
market
iD Referral customer demand of the 
infomediary 
rD Direct customer demand of the retailer 
p Price of the product 
t Price charged for the demand referral 
service
D Market share proportion of the 
infomediary 
E Price sensitivity parameter 
r Customer rebate for the reviews 
k rebate sensitivity parameter 
K incentive cost parameter 
Table 1. Notation. 
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2
max( )
2i ir
r
tD
K                                            (3) 
Substituting Eq. 2 into Eq. 3 and solving the first 
derivate of Eq. 3 according to r, we can get the 
optimal customer rebate *r
* ktr K                                                                 (4) 
The superscript * denotes the optimal decision 
variables in Stackelberg scenario. Next, 
considering the retailer determines the optimal 
retailing and referral service price the profit 
function of retailer can be written as 
,
max ( )r i r ip t
p D D tD                                     (5) 
Substituting Eqs. 1, 2 and 4 into Eq. 5 and solving 
the first derivate according to p, t respectively, we 
have the optimal retailing price *p and service 
price *t
2 2
*
2 2 2
[2 ( ) ]
8 ( )
k k D
p
k k
K EK DK
EK EK
                                 (6) 
2 2
*
2 2 2
[( ) 4 ]
8 ( )
k D
t
k k
EK K DEK
EK EK
                                 (7) 
Since the optimal solution of Eq. 5, the Hessian 
Matrix ( )rH 3 must be negative definite matrix. We 
can derive ( )rH 3
2
2 2
4
( )
2
r
k
H
k k
E EK
EK K
§ · ¨ ¸¨ ¸3  ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹
                                 (8) 
If parameters k and E  satisfy  
2 2 28 ( ) 0k kEK EK  !                                    (9) 
The objective function r3 must be jointly concave 
in ( p , t ). Hence, we prove that policies  p and t
are optimal. Substituting Eqs. 6 and 7 to Eq. 4 the  
optimal customer rebate *r can be described as 
2
*
2 2 2
[( ) 4 ]
8 ( )
k kD
r
k k
EK DEK
EK EK
                                 (10) 
Consequently rational infomediary and retailer will 
commit to participate in the referral demand 
cooperation only if the retailing price p* is higher than 
the price of referral service t*. And we can obtain 
2(1 ) (1 3 )kD D EK t                                       (11) 
From Eqs. 9 and 11 the feasible region of 
parameters k can be described as following 
^ `
2
(1 3 ) 2 2
,(3 2 2) ,if 0
(1 ) 2
2 2
(4 1) ,(3 2 2) ,if 1
2
k
D EK EK DD
D EK EK D
­­ ½   d°® ¾°¯ ¿®°    °¯
4. Service contract coordinating the online 
retail supply chain 
If the whole online retail supply chain acts as a 
centralized system, the profit of supply chain can 
be described as 
2
,
max ( )
2s i rp r
r
p D D
K                                 (13) 
The subscript s denotes the optimal decision 
variables in centralized scenario. To maximize the 
system profit the retailing price sp  and customer 
rebate sr are chosen according to the following 
24s
D
p
k
K
EK                                                   (14) 
24s
kD
r
kEK                                                    (15) 
Based on Eqs. 14 and 15, parameters k must 
satisfy ^ `min 2 ,k EK K  to ensure the retailer 
and infomediary to participate in the supply 
chain cooperation. 
(12) 
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It is obvious that the system optimal price is 
higher than the retailer optimal price. Therefore, it 
reveals that the service price-only contract can 
not coordinate the supply chain system. The 
separation of marketing and sales operation 
between infomediary and retailer will result in 
inefficiency in the supply chain.  
The customer incentive activities result in 
considerable costs. When the demand is affected 
by infomediary effort, such as buy-back, rebate 
and returns contract alone can not achieve 
channel coordination [22, 23]. But the marketing 
cost sharing mechanism can help supply chain 
attain a win–win goal [24, 25]. 
We assume the retailer provides J ( [0,1]J  )
percent of customers’ rebate cost as well as 
referral price t.
The superscript   denotes the variables in this 
scenario with customer rebate cost sharing 
contract. 
Let i3  be the profit of infomediary and r3  the 
profit of retailer. We can get 
2(1 )
max[ ]
2i ir
r
tD
J K                                     (16) 
According to r we can get the optimal customer 
rebate 
*
(1 )
kt
r J K 
                                                     (17) 
If the supply chains achieve coordination, the 
customer rebate of infomediary in decentralized 
scenario equals to that in centralized scenario.  
Substituting Eq. 15 into Eq. 17 we can obtain 
2(4 )k t
D
EKJ K
                                                (18) 
So when the online infomediary provides demand 
referral service to the retailer, the retailer must 
share 
2(4 )k t
D
EKJ K
  percent of the customer  
incentive cost in addition to unit t service fee.      
This customer incentive cost sharing contract 
can achieve coordination of the online retail 
supply chain. 
5. Numerical examples 
To explore the effects of the referral service and 
customer rebate of the decentralized and 
centralized supply chains, we give some 
numerical examples in this section.  
The basic settings with respect to the parameters 
are summarized in Table 2. 
For a given market share proportion D , we can get 
the minimum lower k  and fixed upper k . An 
interesting observation from Fig. 2 is that as D
increases, the range of parameter k ( k k k'   )
increases firstly and decreases subsequently, 
where k'  indicates the feasible range of rebate 
sensitivity or customer referral effectiveness. 
Therefore, it reveals that when the proportion of 
online referral demand accounts for a small market 
share (From Eq. 12 parameter D  is assumed 
smaller than 0.293), the possible variance of 
customer rebate sensitivity or referral effectiveness 
increases with the growth of referral segment. But 
if the market share of online referral demand 
exceeds 0.293, the opposite change will happen. 
Thus, infomediary should continuously improve 
the features of eWOM to help shoppers make 
quick, easy and informed shopping decisions, 
Parameters Base 
values 
The potential customers of the whole market 
(D)
100 
The price sensitivity parameter ( E ) 2
The incentive cost parameter  (K ) 0.5 
Parameters Base 
values 
The potential customers of the whole market 
(D)
100 
The price sensitivity parameter ( E ) 2
The incentive cost  parameter  (K ) 0.5 
Table 2. Parameters setting in the numerical examples.
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thereby increasing its efficiency of potential 
customer conversion.  
Considering the direct demand of retailer is 
dominant to the referral demand of infomediary or 
vice versa, we assume 0.1D  or 0.6D  
respectively on condition that the numerical 
example of D must satisfy Eqs. 9 and 11.  
Furthermore, the feasible region of parameters k is 
(0.881, 2.414) while 0.1D   and (1.183, 2.414) 
while 0.6D  .
The optimal solutions of retailing price, referral 
service price and customer rebate are listed in 
Table 3-1 and Table 3-2. 
From Table 3-1 and Table 3-2, we can see that the 
segments of direct and referral demand have 
important influence on feasible rebate sensitivity k
and optimal decisions of retailing price, referral 
service price and customer rebate. 
Figure 2. Effect of market share D on feasible range of parameter k .
k 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 
p* 22.457 22.500 22.926 23.678 24.754 26.191 28.067 30.513 33.745 38.124 44.304 53.571 68.855 98.561 180.540 
t* 22.004 20.000 18.870 18.324 18.221 18.501 19.160 20.240 21.846 24.174 27.596 32.857 41.667 58.946 106.862 
r* 39.608 40.000 41.515 43.978 47.375 51.804 57.479 64.767 74.275 87.027 104.865 131.429 175.003 259.362 491.564 
Table 3-1. Optimal solutions in the numerical examples ( 0.1D   ). 
k 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.000 2.100 2.200 
p* 12.719 14.052 15.495 17.143 19.113 21.570 24.778 29.195 35.714 46.358 66.921 
t* 0.359 2.307 4.047 5.714 7.430 9.327 11.583 14.486 18.571 25.034 37.275 
r* 0.862 5.999 11.332 17.143 23.775 31.710 41.700 55.048 74.286 105.141 164.008
Table 3-2. Optimal solutions in the numerical examples ( 0.6D  ).
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Figure 3-1 and 3-2 illustrate how the profits of 
the supply chain in decentralized and centralized 
scenarios depend on the different parameter k.
The total supply chain profit increases with the rebate 
sensitivity or the recommendation effectiveness 
under any condition of dual-market segments. 
We denote 4K   and 1t  .
The retailer provides customer incentive cost 
sharing contract to encourage infomediary to 
recommend customers.
Figure. 4 presents the sharing percentage of 
customer incentive cost and optimal customer 
rebate for different values of rebate sensitivity k.
6. Conclusions 
We elaborate on the problem of demand referral 
service of infomediary, customer incentive effect 
and coordination contract in this article. With the 
sharing of customers’ comments and experiences 
the infomediary helps to meet and match the 
common needs between the numerous and rapidly 
growing consumers and suppliers. The online retail 
supply chain benefits from the horizontal referral 
service. The higher referral service price paid by the 
retailer will activate the infomediary to exert its 
customer incentive. But the service price contract 
alone can not achieve supply chain coordination. 
The customer incentive cost sharing contract 
besides service price is proved to coordinate the 
Internet supply chain. We show that efficient referral 
decision brings about more opportunity for supply 
chain cooperation. We believe that these insights 
will be useful for managers in dual-channel supply 
chain strategy. 
The demand referral and channel cooperation in the 
supply chain is a meaningful and interesting field. 
This research helps us to understand how online 
retailer and infomediary interact with each other with 
respect to the customers recommendation conduct. 
As stated in the basic model settings, only one 
retailer  and  sole  contract  of  incentive cost 
sharing is considered. In our futurestudy, we will 
Figure. 3-1 Profit of supply chain when 0.1D  .
Figure. 3-2 Profit of supply chain when 0.6D  
Figure. 4 Optimal customer rebate and  
sharing percentage of incentive cost in 
 supply chain coordination scenario. 
ReferralserviceandcustomerincentiveinonlineretailsupplyChain, Y.G.Chenetal./261Ͳ269
Vo.12,April2014268
explore the different mechanisms of servic 
recommendation and various structures of supply 
chain coordination contract. 
Acknowledgements 
This research was partially supported by the Zhejiang 
Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China under 
Grant No. LY12G02006, the Humanity and Social 
Science Youth Foundation of the Ministry of Education of 
the Republic of China under Grand No. 11YJC630028 
and 13YJC630203, and the Philosophy and Social 
Science Research Project of Zhejiang Province under 
Grant No. 13NDJC054YB. This work was also supported 
by the Key Soft Science Research Project of Zhejiang 
Province under Grant No. 2013C25045 and the National 
Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 
51375429 and 71271188. 
References 
[1] CNNIC, "The 31th Statistical Report on Internet 
Development_in_China,"_http://221.176.14.98/www1.cnni
c.cn/IDR/ReportDownloads/201302/P0201303125368259
20279.pdf, February 28, 2013. 
[2] J. M. Swaminathan and S. R. Tayur, "Models for 
Supply Chains in E-Business," Management Science, 
vol. 49, no. 10, pp. 1387-1406, 2003.  
[3] M. Fathollah et al., "Developing a Conceptual 
Framework for Simulation Analysis in a Supply Chain 
Based on Common Platform (Scbcp)," Journal of 
Applied Research and Technology, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 
163-184, 2009. 
[4] S. M. Disney et al., "Assessing the Impact of E-
Business on Supply Chain Dynamics," International 
Journal of Production Economics, vol. 89, no. 2, pp. 109-
118, 2004. 
[5] M. G. Helander and H. M. Khalid, "Modeling the 
Customer_in_Electronic_Commerce,"_Applied_Ergono
mics, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 609-619, 2000. 
[6] W. Chu et al., "The Role of on-Line Retailer Brand 
and Infomediary Reputation in Increasing Consumer 
Purchase Intention," International Journal of Electronic 
Commerce, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 115-127, 2005. 
[7] Viswanathan et al., "Online Infomediaries and Price 
Discrimination: Evidence from the Automotive Retailing 
Sector," Journal of Marketing, vol. 71, no. 3, pp. 89-
107, 2007. 
[8] J. Y. Son et al., "Consumer Adoption of Net-Enabled 
Infomediaries: Theoretical Explanations and an 
Empirical Test," Journal of the Association for 
Information Systems, vol. 7, no. 7, pp. 473-508, 2006. 
[9] Y. Chen et al., "Referral Infomediaries," Marketing 
Science, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 412-434, 2002. 
[10]_Y. Chen and J. Yao, "Referral Service of 
Infomediary in B2c Supply Chain," International Journal 
of Networking and Virtual Organisations, vol. 10, no. 3/4, 
pp. 414-426, 2012. 
[11] M. Trusov et al., "Effects of Word-of-Mouth Versus 
Traditional Marketing: Findings from an Internet Social 
Networking Site," Journal of Marketing, vol. 73, no. 5, 
pp. 90-102, 2009. 
[12] C. C. Yang and A. Chung, "Intelligent Infomediary 
for Web Financial Information," Decision Support 
Systems, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 65-80, 2004. 
[13] A. Ghose et al., "The Impact of Internet Referral 
Services on a Supply Chain," Information Systems 
Research, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 300-319, Sep 2007. 
[14] Y. Chen and J. Xie, "Online Consumer Review: 
Word-of-Mouth as a New Element of Marketing 
Communication Mix," Management Science, vol. 54, no. 
3, pp. 477-491, 2008. 
[15]_X. Luo, "Quantifying the Long-Term Impact of 
Negative Word of Mouth on Cash Flows and Stock 
Prices," Marketing Science, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 148-
165, 2009. 
[16] C. M. K. Cheung and M. K. O. Lee, "What Drives 
Consumers to Spread Electronic Word of Mouth in 
Online Consumer-Opinion Platforms," Decision Support 
Systems, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 218-225, 2012. 
[17]_H. Dai and A. F. Salam, "Antecedents and 
Consequents of Service Consumption Experience in 
Electronic Mediated Environment: Empirical Evidence 
from Electronic Service Industry in China," Journal of 
System and Management Sciences, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 
141-151, 2011. 
[18] Y. Liu et al., "Channel Selection in E-Commerce 
Age: A Strategic Analysis of Co-Op Advertising Models," 
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management, vol. 
6, no. 1, pp. 89-103, 2013. 
[19] A. A. Tsay and N. Agrawal, "Channel Conflict and 
Coordination in the E-Commerce Age," Production and 
ReferralserviceandcustomerincentiveinonlineretailsupplyChain, Y.G.Chenetal./261Ͳ269
JournalofAppliedResearchandTechnology 269
Operations Management, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 93-110, 
Spring 2004.  
[20]_M. Elizondo-Cortés and R. Aceves-García, "Strategy 
of Solution for the Inventory Routing Problem  
Based on Separable Cross Decomposition," Journal of 
Applied Research and Technology, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 139-
148, 2005. 
[21] R. Yan and Z. Pei, "Retail Services and Firm Profit 
in a Dual-Channel Market," Journal of Retailing and 
Consumer Services, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 306-314, 2009. 
[22] H. Krishnan et al., "Coordinating Contracts for 
Decentralized Supply Chains with Retailer 
Promotional Effort," Management Science, vol. 50, 
no. 1, pp. 48-63, 2004. 
[23] T. A. Taylor, "Supply Chain Coordination under 
Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects," Management 
Science, vol. 48, no. 8, pp. 992-1007, 2002. 
[24] S. X. Li et al., "Cooperative Advertising, Game 
Theory and Manufacturer–Retailer Supply Chains," 
Omega, vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 347-357, 2002. 
[25] A. H. L. Lau et al., "Usefulness of Resale Price 
Maintenance under Different Levels of Sales-Effort Cost 
and System-Parameter Uncertainties," European 
Journal of Operational Research, vol. 203, no. 2, pp. 
513-525, 2010. 















